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Herd behavior is argued by many to be present in many markets. Existing models of such behavior
have been subjected to two apparently devastating critiques. The continuous investment critique
is that in the basic model herds disappear if simple zero-one investment decisions are replaced by
the more appealing assumption that investment decisions are continuous. The price critique is that
herds disappear if, as seems natural, other investors can observe asset market prices. We argue that
neither critique is devastating. We show that once we replace the unappealing exogenous timing
assumption of the early models that investors move in a pre-speciﬁed order by a more appealing
endogenous timing assumption that investors can move whenever they choose then herds reappear.
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Calvo and Mendoza (1996)) and Chari and Kehoe (2002) argue that herd behavior accounts
for a substantial fraction of the volatility in capital ﬂows to emerging markets. More gener-
ally, Devenow and Welch (1996) report that participants in ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnancial
economists believe that herd-like behavior is widespread.
A recent literature has developed models of herd behavior. The early models of herd
behavior of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) have been crit-
icized on the grounds that two unpalatable assumptions play a key role in generating herds.
First, investment decisions are zero-one. Second, the models abstract from prices. Lee (1993)
argued that if investment decisions are continuous then herds disappear. Avery and Zemsky
(2000) argued once agents are allowed to trade in ﬁnancial markets, prices reveal information
and herds disappear. We label these critiques the continuous investment critique and the
price critique respectively. The investment critique seems to quite strong because the scale of
investments can often be changed easily. The price critique is also strong because it suggests
that herd behavior will not be observed in ﬁnancial markets. Taken together these critiques
seem to be devastating to anyone who wants to use the herd framework to understand actual
economies.
We argue that neither critique is devastating and that both can be overturned by
replacing an unappealing simplifying assumption of the early herd models with a more nat-
ural assumption for applied situations. The unappealing assumption used in the early herd
literature is an exogenous timing assumption, namely that investors move in a pre-speciﬁed
order. We show that when we replace this assumption with the more natural and perhaps
more realistic endogenous timing assumption, namely that investors can move at any time,then the two critiques are overturned and herds reappear.
We begin with a simple baseline model similar to the early models to set the stage
for the critiques and our answers. In it investors move in a pre-speciﬁed order and must
invest in either a risky or a safe project, so that the model has exogenous timing and discrete
investments. Each investor receives a private signal indicating that the returns on the risky
project are either high or low. In this model a small number of high signals leads all future
investors to invest in the risky project regardless of their signals while a small number of low
signals leads all future investors to forgo investing in the risky project. These outcomes are
ineﬃcient relative to a benchmark public signal game. We call these outcomes herds because
they satisfy two criteria: investors make the same decisions regardless of their signals and the
outcomes are ineﬃcient.
We show that both the continuous investment critique and the price critique have merit
with exogenous timing. To illustrate the continuous investment critique we take the baseline
model with exogenous timing and allow investment to be continuous. We ﬁnd that Lee’s
(1993) critique applies: herds of investment disappear. The basic idea is that if investment
decisions are continuous then diﬀerences in signals always lead to at least small diﬀerences
in investment. These diﬀerences in investment can be used to infer the underlying signal so
that information never becomes trapped and there are no herds.
To illustrate the price critique we take the baseline model with exogenous timing
and allow asset trade with market determined prices. We ﬁnd that Avery and Zemsky’s
(1998) critique applies: herds of investment disappear. The basic idea is that prices reveal
information. In particular, prices continuously adjust to trades and hence can be used to
infer underlying signals so that information never becomes trapped and there are no herds.
2We show that both critiques are overturned when we allow for endogenous timing.
Under this timing there is a tradeoﬀ between investing and waiting: waiting is potentially
beneﬁcial because investors can gain information but it is costly because of discounting. We
ﬁnd that even with continuous investment there can be herds of investment and that even
with prices and asset trade there can be herds of investment. In both cases, the reason
is that at some point the gains from waiting for more information are outweighed by the
costs from waiting due to discounting and investors choose to invest with relatively little
information. We show that these resulting herds of investment are ineﬃcient relative to a
natural benchmark game with public signals.
An interesting feature of our results is that in the baseline model with discrete in-
vestments and without asset trade, the investment outcomes with endogenous timing are
essentially identical to those with exogenous timing. Thus, in that model, the exogenous
timing assumption leads to a useful and innocuous simpliﬁcation of the analysis. With either
continuous investments or asset trading, the outcomes under the two timing assumptios can
be quite diﬀerent.
In the Appendix we take up a third critique, namely there are other ways to share
information besides having investors infer information from investment decisions. In par-
ticular, if investors are allowed to communicate with each other, they have no incentive to
misrepresent their information and there is no essential reason for information to get trapped.
This information-sharing critique also suggests that herds are quite fragile.
To investigate this critique we amend the baseline model by allowing investors to send
messages about their signal to other investors. We show that this critique has some merit
when timing is exogenous by showing there is an equilibrium in which all investors truthfully
3reveal their signals and there are no herds. We then show this critique can be overturned
by allowing endogenous timing and assuming that there is a small early-mover advantage in
that the rate of return earned on the risky project is higher when there are fewer investors.
We show that even with information sharing there can still be herds.
Our paper is related to an extensive literature on herds. (See the survey by Bikhchan-
dani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998) for results from this literature and references.) Several
papers are closely related. Caplin and Leahy (1993), Chamley and Gale (1994), Gul and
Lindholm (1995) allow for private signals and endogenous timing of decisions, however, none
of them is directed towards the critiques of the early herd literature. The most similar of these
is Chamley and Gale (1994) who emphasize the same tradeoﬀ between the cost of waiting
due to discounting and the beneﬁts to waiting from garnering information from the actions
of others. They also share our emphasis, as does Vives (1997), that equilibria are socially
ineﬃcient due to infomation externalities.
Our paper is also related to those of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Lee (1998) and
Avery and Zemsky (1998). Glosten and Milgrom show that prices eventually reveal the true
value of the asset as long as informed traders trade in all periods. In this sense, Glosten
and Milgrom (1985) is a critique of herd models the predates the recent herd literature. Lee
(1998) and Avery and Zemsky (1998) retain the asumption of exogenous timing and oﬀer two
possible answers to the price critique. Lee shows that ﬁxed costs of trading can lead informed
investors to stop trading after some point so that information becomes trapped. Avery and
Zemsky show that with nonmonotonic signals even with exogenous timing, herds can appear.
One feature of our formulation that diﬀers from the market microstructure literature following
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) is that we allow for both investment and asset trading decisions.
4Allowing for both seems essential in developing models of herd behavior in some situations,
such as those of capital ﬂo w si n t oa n do u to fe m e r g i n gm a r k e te c o n o m i e s .
Finally, this paper is also related to the large literature about prices revealing infor-
mation following Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
1. The Baseline Model of Herd Behavior
Consider an economy that lasts for T periods, from t =0 ,1,...,T.There are N<T
risk neutral investors who must decide to invest in either a safe asset or a risky asset. The
investors are ordered in a sequence, t =1 ,2,...,N. Investor t starts in period t with one
unit invested in the safe asset and must make a once-and-for-all decision in period t to switch
this unit to the risky asset. This decision is irrevocable. Let xt =1denote an investment
in the risky project in period t and xt =0denotes no investment in the risky project. For
c o n v e n i e n c ew es a yt h a ti n v e s t o rt invests whenever xt =1and we say that investor t does
not invest whenever xt =0 . The state of the economy y is either high, denoted H,o rl o w ,
denoted L. The state of the economy is unknown to investors and it becomes known in period
T.
Investing in the risky asset in period t yields a return of eR(T−t) if the state is high
and 0 f r o mt h er i s k ya s s e ti ft h es t a t ei sl o w .W en o r m a l i z et h er e t u r ni nt h es a f ea s s e tt ob e
1. An investor who invests in the risky asset in period t gets an expected return of
e
R(T−t)Probt(state is H)
where Probt(state is H) is the conditional probability that the investor assigns to the state
being H.
At the beginning of period t, investor t privately observes one of two possible signals
5s ∈ {H,L}: that the economy is in a high state or that the economy is in the low state. The
signals are informative and symmetric in the sense that
Pr(s = H | y = H)=P r ( s = L | y = L)=q>1/2 (1)
as well as conditionally independent across investors.
The public history in any period t, ht =( x1,...,x t−1), is the sequence of investment
decisions up through the beginning of period t where xt =1denotes an investment in the
risky project in period t and xt =0denotes no investment in the risky project. We let pt(ht)
be the public beliefs, namely the probability that the state is high conditional on the public
history ht. Investor t0s history is the public history ht plus this investor’s private signal st. The
investor t’s strategy is a function xt(ht,s t). Investor t0s beliefs are pt(ht,st), where pt(ht,s t) is
the probability that the state is high conditional on the history ht and the signal st.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a collection of strategies and beliefs {xt,p t}N
t=1 such
that (i) for all t, histories ht, and signals st, the strategy xt(ht,s t) solves
V (pt(ht,s t),t)=m a x
x∈X e
R(T−t)pt(ht,s t)x +( 1− x) (2)
where X = {0,1} and (ii) the beliefs satisfy Bayes’ rule wherever it applies.
In constructing an equilibrium, we ﬁnd it useful to ﬁrst deﬁne the public beliefs pt(ht)
given some public history ht and then use them to construct each investor’s strategies. For
arbitrary beliefs p, we use Bayes’ rule to deﬁne PH(p) and PL(p) as the updated beliefs that
the state is high given that signals H and L were received:
PH(p)=
pq




p(1 − q)+( 1− p)q
, (4)
6where q is deﬁn e di n( 1 ) .L e tP(0) = p0,P(1) = PH(P(0)),P(2) = PH(P(1)), and so on, and
let P(−1) = PL(P(0)),P (−2) = PL(P(−1)), and so on. Thus, P(k) for k>0 is the prior
probability that the state is high if k high signals have been received, and P(k) for k<0 is
the prior probability that the state is high if k low signals have been received. Notice from
the symmetry in (1) that
PH(PL(p)) = PL(PH(p)) = p. (5)
It follows from (5) that the eﬀect on the prior of a given set of signals is summarized by
the number of high signals minus the number of low signals in the set. Thus, for example,
receiving two high signals and one low signal yields the same prior as receiving one high
signal.
We focus on the region of the parameter space that satisﬁes the following:
e
R(T−N)P(0) > 1 (6)
e
RTP(−1) < 1 (7)
Note that because R>0 these assumptions imply the following. Assumption (6) implies that
in any period t, between the two options of investing in the risky asset given belief P(0) or
never investing in the risky asset, it is better to invest. Assumption (7) implies that at any
date t, between the two options of investing in the risky asset given belief P(−1) or never
investing in the risky asset, it is better to not invest. Under assumptions (6) and (7), given
beliefs p, each investor’s choice is static and of the form
x(p)=

   
   
1 if p ≥ P(0)
0 if p ≤ P(−1)

   
   
(8)
7w h e r ew eh a v em a d eu s eo ft h ef e a t u r et h a tb e l i e f sa r ea l w a y so ft h ef o r mP(k) for some k.
Now we describe, informally, the outcomes of the equilibrium that we will construct.
Investor 1 invests if the signal is high and does not if the signal is low. Investor 20s decision
depends on the history from period 1. If there was an investment in period 1, investor 2
invests regardless of the signal that investor receives and so do all future investors. We say
that this history starts a cascade with investment. If there was zero investment in period
1, then the investor 2 invests if and only if the signal received is high. At the beginning of
period 3, if there has been no investment in either periods 1 or 2, then no investor invests
in period 3 or in any subsequent period. We will say that this history starts a cascade with
no investment . If there has been no investment in period 0 b u ta ni n v e s t m e n ti np e r i o d1 ,
then the investor in period 2 invests if and only if the signal received is high. (Note that we
use the term cascade to mean an outcome in which after some point all investors take the
same action regardless of their signal. We will deﬁne a herd to be a cascade that is ineﬃcient
relevant to a natural benchmark.)
More generally, histories of the form (1), (0,1,1), (0,1,0,1),...,(0,1,0,1,...,0,1,1)
start cascades with investment. Histories of the form (0,0), (0,1,0,0),..., (0,1,0,1,...,
0,1,0,0) start cascades with no investment.
More formally, we proceed as follows. The strategy for investor t is
xt(ht,s t)=

   
   
1 if pt(ht,s t) ≥ P(0)
0 otherwise

   
   
. (9)
Deﬁne public beliefs pt(ht) recursively as follows from the initial prior P(0).F o rt ≥ 0, given
8xt and pt(ht) equal to either P(−1) or P(0),
pt+1(ht+1)=

   
   
PH(pt(ht)) if xt =1
PL(pt(ht)) if xt =0

   
   
. (10)
For pt(ht) greater than P(0) or less than P(−1), beliefs are unchanged, so that pt+1(ht+1)=
pt(ht).
Notice that, for simplicity, we have constructed an equilibrium in which strategies
depend only on the probability that a state is high and not on time or on the number of
investors who have previously invested.
Built into these beliefs is the idea that investors look at past investors’ actions and
try to infer their signals. On the equilibrium path, investors infer the following. If investor t
takes an action which is consistent with that investor having received a high signal but not
consistent with that investor having received a low signal, then all future investors infer that
a high signal was received. Inferences are made similarly for actions consistent with a low
signal but not with a high signal. If a investor takes an action which is consistent with both a
high signal and a low signal, then future investors infer nothing. Finally, oﬀ the equilibrium
path, if a investor takes an action which is consistent with neither a high signal nor a low
signal, then future investors infer nothing.
It is easy to see that the constructed strategies and beliefs constitute a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. To see this note that the constructed beliefs satisfy Bayes’ rule. We repeatedly
use the observation that by construction, for any history ht,p t(ht)=P(k) for some integer
k. Suppose that investor t faces a history (ht,s t) that has associated beliefs pt(ht,s t) ≥ P(0).
Under assumption (6), investing gives a strictly higher return than not investing. Suppose
next that investor t faces a history (ht,s t) that has associated beliefs pt(ht,s t) ≤ P(−1). Under
9assumption (7), not investing gives a strictly higher return than investing. We summarize
this discussion with the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Under assumption (6), the constructed strategies and beliefs consti-
tute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Next, we are interested in exploring if there is any sense in which the outcomes in
this equilibrium are ineﬃcient relative to some benchmark. Our benchmark is a public signal
game in which the signals are observed by all investors. In period t, given the history of
signals st =( s0,s 1,...,s t), the history of investments is irrelevant. Thus, we deﬁne both
investments zt and beliefs pt as functions of st alone. An equilibrium is deﬁned as before.
Let zt(st) denote the investment decision in period t with signal history st. In the private
signal game, given a history of signals st, we can recursively substitute out for the investment
strategies and write the investment outcome simply as a function of st. Let xt(st) denote such
an investment outcome.
We say that the private signal game has a herd at st if (i) for all future histories sr
containing st,z r(sr) is that same for all sr and (ii) for some future history sr containing st,
zr(sr) 6= xr(sr). We say that a herd at st is a herd of investment if xr(sr) > 0 for all future
histories sr containing st. Likewise, a herd at st is a herd of no investment if xr(sr)=0for
all future histories sr containing st.
The ﬁrst clause in our deﬁnition of a herd requires that individuals make the same
decisions regardless of their signals, namely that the outcome is a cascade. The second clause
requires that these decisions are ineﬃcient relative to the public signal game, so that a herd
is an ineﬃcient cascade. Several authors (including Banerjee 1992) have deﬁned notions of
10herd-like behavior which only require the ﬁrst clause, namely our notion of cascade. With
only the ﬁrst clause, if we started agents with prior below P(−N) they would never invest
in either game regardless of the signals. In a sense everyone is doing the same thing because
they are all doing the right thing. The second clause ensures that when everyone is doing the
same thing, relative to the public signal game, they are doing the wrong thing.
Proposition 2. (Herd Behavior) Under (6) and (7) the equilibrium has both herds
of investment and herds of no investment.
Proof. To see that there is a herd of investment consider the history of signals sN =
(H,L,L,...,L). In the private signal game, xt =1for all t. In the public signal game, using
(6) and (7), z0 = z1 =1 , and zt =0for t ≥ 2. Likewise there are clearly herds of no
investment. Consider the history of signals sN =( L,L,H,...,H). In the private signal game
xt =0for all t, while in the public signal game for t ≥ 4 the prior rises above P(0) and zt is
1 thereafter. Q.E.D.
Our demonstration that herds are robust depends crucially on allowing for endogenous
t i m i n g ,t h a ti s ,a l l o w i n gi n v e s t o r st oi n v e s ta ta n yt i m et h e yc h o o s e . I nC h a r ia n dK e h o e
(2002) we analyse this baseline model allowing for endogenous timing. It turns out that
the equilibrium in that model is essentially identical to the equilibrium here with exogenous
timing under one additional assumption. This assumption is
e
RTP(0) <v H(P(0))e
R(T−1)P(1) + vL(P(0)) (11)
where vH(p)=pq +( 1− p)(1 − q) is the probability that a high signal is received when the
prior is p and vL(p)=p(1−q)+(1−p)q is the probability that a low signal is received when
the prior is p.
11Assumption (11) essentially says that discounting is small relative to the value of
information. To interpret (11) consider an economy with endogenous timing. The left-side of
(11) is the value of investing in period 0 at P(0). Now, suppose that an investor knows that
if he waits in period 0 , with probability vH(P(0)) he will either be able to infer a high signal
occured and with probability vL(P(0)) he will be able to infer that a low signal occurred.
Then (11) says that the investor is better oﬀ waiting to receive the information rather than
investing immediately.
In a model with endogenous timing waiting and receiving information is beneﬁcial
because investors have the option of not investing if the signals are suﬃciently low. We
call this beneﬁtt h eno-investment option value. The cost of waiting comes from a kind of
discounting in that investors forgo the ﬂow return from investing. Assumption (11) requires
that the no investment option value be large relative to discounting.
To facilitate comparisons between the assumptions made here and the assumptions
made in later sections it is useful to note that (6), (7) and (11) can be written as
V (P(0),N) > 1 (12)
V (P(−1),1) = 1 and (13)
V (P(0),0) <v H(P(0))V (P(1),1) + vL(P(0)). (14)
2. Herds with Continuous Investment
One critique of the baseline herd model is that the results depend critically on the
action space being coarse relative to the signal space. Here we show that this critique has
12some merit. We show that if the action space is continuous then there can be no herds of in-
vestment. We answer this critique by showing that once we drop the unappealing assumption
of exogenous timing the critique is overturned.
A. The Continuous Investment Critique
Let us now suppose that the investment choices are continuous in that X =[ 0 ,1]. We
assume that an investment of x units in period t yields a return of eR(T−t)f(x) if the state
is high and zero if the state is low where f is strictly concave, f0(0) is ﬁnite, f(0) = 0 and
f(1) = 1. The assumption that f0(0) is ﬁnite is natural in any applied situation in which
there is either a ﬁxed cost or a minimum scale of production.
Consider the problem of investor t for some given beliefs p, given in (2), namely
V (p,t)=m a x
x∈X e
R(T−t)pf(x)+( 1− x) (15)




Let p(t)=eR(t−T)/f0(0). Clearly, investor t0s optimal investment given beliefs p is
x(p,t)=

   
   
(f0)−1(eR(t−T)/p) if p ≥ p(t)
0 otherwise

   
   
. (17)
The deﬁnition of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium here is the same as in the baseline model.
We make the following assumptions,
V (P(0),N) > 1 (18)
V (P(−1),1) = 1. (19)
13Assumptions (18) and (19) are identical to (12) and (13) except that here investment decisions
are continuous.
We will show that, in contrast to baseline model with discrete investments, with con-
tinuous investments there can be no herds of investment. Intuitively, as long as the prior is
above the cutoﬀ level p(t),the investor t invests some positive amount, say xt, given by (17).




and, given some public belief pt−1, the action xt reveals investor t’s signal. More formally
we have that investor’s beliefs are recursively deﬁned as follows. On the equilibrium path,
investors invert the invest decisions to infer the underlying signals and update their beliefs
in the obvious manner. For any period t, with public beliefs P(k) such that
x(P(k +1 ) ,t) 6= x(P(k − 1),t) (20)
public beliefs at t+1are P(k+1)if xt = x(P(k+1),t) and public beliefs at t+1are P(k−1)
if xt = x(P(k − 1),t). For any period t with public beliefs P(k) such that
x(P(k +1 ) ,t)=x(P(k − 1),t), (21)
public beliefs at t +1are simply P(k). For investment decisions which are not on the equi-
librium path we assume that public beliefs at t+1are simply the public beliefs at t. Investor
t updates the public beliefs using the signal and Bayes’ rule. The investment strategies are
given by substituting these beliefs into (17). Clearly, these strategies and beliefs constitute a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
We then have the following proposition.
14Proposition 3. (The Continuous Investment Critique) In the continuous investment
model, under (18) and (19), there are herds of no investment but there are no herds of
investment.
Proof.W e ﬁrst show that there is a herd of no investment. Consider the outcome
path when the ﬁrst two signals are (L,L). The investor at 0 has beliefs P(−1) and under (19)
does not invest. The public belief in period 1 is P(−1) because (20) is satisﬁed in period 0.
To see these note that if the investor at 0 would have received a H, under (18) this investor
would have invested. The investor in period 1, having received a signal L, lowers his beliefs
to P(−2) and under (19) does not invest. The public belief in period 2 is P(−2) because
(20) is satisﬁed in period 1. In all subsequent periods, regardless of the signals, no investor
invests and public beliefs stay at P(−2). This is because (21) holds in all such periods. Thus
the outcome path in the private signal game for any set of signals that begins with (L,L) is
no investment in all periods. The outcome associated with the signals (L,L,H,H,...,H) is
a herd of no investment. In the public signal game with these signals the beliefs rise to P(0)
in period 4 and thus investor 4 invests. So do all subsequent investors. In the private signal
game these signals lead to no investment in all periods.
We prove that there are no herds of investment by showing that in any outcome path
with positive investment in the tails, the public can infer private signals exactly so that
the signals are eﬀectively public. Suppose we have an outcome path where in all periods
r following some period t investment is positive. Then, from (18) and (19), we have that
investor r0s beliefs must be at least as large as P(0) for all r. The public’s beliefs must be at
least P(−1). At these beliefs, the investment strategies satisfy (20) and the public inverts the
investment decision to infer the signal exactly in period t and all subsequent periods. Next
15we show that in all periods before t, the public can infer the signal exactly. To see this result
note that if public beliefs reach P(−2) in any period, no investor invests and public beliefs
stay at P(−2). Thus, in all periods before t public beliefs must have been at least P(−1). But
then, the investment strategies satisfy (20) and can be inverted to obtain the signal. Since
the signals are eﬀectively public, it follows that the outcomes of the private and public signal
games must coincide. Q.E.D.
B. Answering the Continuous Investment Critique
Here we show that once we allow for endogenous timing herds reappear even though
investment decisions are continuous.
The model with endogenous timing is identical to that with exogenous timing with
several exceptions. Here we allow investors to invest at any time, although the decision must
be made once-and-for-all. In each period t =0 ,...,T 1 with T1 <T ,one signal arrives to the
economy and is randomly distributed to one and only one agent among the set of investors
who have not already received a signal.1 (Conceptually, it is easy to instead allow signals to
arrive intermittently, say, according to a Poisson process. The results are similar, however,
the resulting algebra is more complicated.)
We let the number of investors N be large relative to T1. The state becomes known
at T>T 1. All that happens from T1 +1to T is that the investments grow, but during this
time no signals arrive and no actions can be taken.
The only publicly observable event in any period t is the aggregate quantity of in-
vestment denoted by xt. The public history ht =( x0,x 1,,...,x t−1) records the aggregate
quantity of investments in each period up through the beginning of period t. Investors also
16record the signal they receive, if any, and the date they receive it. Thus, the history of an
investor i at t who received a signal at r is hit =( ht,s r,r) and we let (ht,∅,∅) denote the
history of an investor who has not received a signal. Notice that at each date t, given their
histories, investors can be described as belonging to one of several groups. Any investor who
has already invested is inactive. T h ea c t i v ei n v e s t o r si np e r i o dt consist of a newly informed
investor who receives the signal at the beginning of period t, previously informed investors
who received a signal at some date r before t and uninformed investors who have not yet
received a signal.
An investor’s strategy and beliefs are sequences of functions xt(hit) and pt(hit) that
map their histories into actions and into the probability that the state is high. The payoﬀs
are deﬁned as follows. The payoﬀ f o ra ni n v e s t o rw h om a k e sa ni n v e s t m e n td e c i s i o ni np e r i o d










where µt(hit+1|hit) is the conditional distribution over history at t +1given the history at
t. Clearly, an investor invests at t if Vt(hit) ≥ Wt(hit) and waits otherwise. Notice that the
conditional distributions µt(hit+1|hit) are induced from the strategies and the structure of
exogenous uncertainty of the game in the obvious way. Notice also that we have imposed
symmetry by supposing that all investors who have the same histories take the same actions
and have the same beliefs. Here, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a set of strategies xt(hit),
a set of conditional distributions µt(hit+1|hit) a n das e to fb e l i e f sp(hit) such that i) for every
17history hit, such that the investor has not invested before t, the waiting decision is optimal
and, conditional on making an investment, the investment level xt(hit) is optimal, ii) the
conditional distributions µit(hit+1|hit) and the beliefs pit(hit) are consistent with Bayes’ rule
wherever possible and arbitrary otherwise.
In addition to (18) and (19) we make the following assumptions,
V (P(0),0) <v H(P(0))V (P(1),1) + vL(P(0)) (24)
and
V (P(1),t) >v H(P(1))V (P(2),t+1 )+vL(P(1))V (P(0),t+1 ) (25)
V (P(2),t) >v H(P(2))V (P(3),t+1 )+vL(P(2))V (P(1),t+1 ) (26)
Note that (19) is identical to (14). Furthermore, (25) and (26) are automatically satisﬁed in
the baseline model. For example, to see that (25) is satisﬁed, note that under (18), V (p,t)=
eR(T−t)p for p ≥ P(0). From Bayes’ rule it follows that P(1) = vH(P(1))P(2) + vL(P(1)P(0)
so that (25) reduces to eR(T−t)P(1) >e R(T−t−1)P(1) which obviously holds.
In this model, waiting and receiving information has two beneﬁts. The ﬁrst is that
investors have the option of never investing if the future information turns out to be suﬃ-
ciently low. We have called this beneﬁt the no investment option value. The second, which
we call the ﬁne-tuning option value, comes from better information allowing investors who
have already decided to invest to adjust the size of their projects. The cost of waiting comes
from a kind of discounting in that investors forgo the ﬂow return from investing.
Assumption (24) requires that the no investment option value be large relative to
discounting. We will use this assumption to ensure that in equilibrium an uninformed investor
18will ﬁnd it optimal to wait at P(0). The right-side of (24) will turn out to be the payoﬀ to an
uninformed investor who follows the following possibly suboptimal strategy at public prior of
P(0). Wait. In the next period invest if he infers that the informed investor received a high
signal and never invest if he infers that the informed investor received a low signal.
Assumptions (25) and (26) require that the ﬁne-tuning option value is small relative
to discounting in the following sense. Assumption (25) requires that investing at a prior of
P(1) dominates waiting one period, receiving a signal and then investing the optimal higher
amount if the signal is high and the optimal lower amount if the signal is low. Assumption
(26) imposes a similar requirement at a prior P(2). We use assumption (25) and (26) to show
that starting at history in which uninformed investors’ priors are P(0), a newly informed
investor who has received a high signal will invest immediately rather than attempting to
learn from the investments of future newly informed investors and then optimally adjusting
the size of his investment. Theses assumptions are satisﬁed if f is suﬃciently concave at
x(P(1),t) and x(P(2),t)
The strategies and beliefs for our equilibrium are as follows. The strategy for all
uninformed and previously informed investors is
xt(hit)=

   
   
1 if pt(hit) ≥ P(1)
0 otherwise

   
   
(27)




   
   
1 if pt(hit) ≥ P(0)
0 otherwise

   
   
(28)
19for t ≤ T1. Notice that the uninformed and previously informed investors need to be more
optimistic than newly informed investors in order to invest before T1.W er e f e rt oP(1) and
P(0) as the cutoﬀ levels for the uninformed and informed investors respectively.
The beliefs of uniformed investors at history hit =( ht,∅,∅) are deﬁned recursively.
Given pt−1(hit−1) and a total investment of xt−1 at t−1, the beliefs at t are given as follows.
For pt−1(hit−1) equal to either P(−1) or P(0)
pt(hit)=

   
   
PL(pt−1(hit−1)) if xt−1 =0 ,
PH(pt−1(hit−1)) if xt−1 > 0

   
   
(29)
where p0(hi0)=P(0). For pt−1(hit−1) either greater than or equal to P(1) or less than or
equal to P(−2),p t(hit)=pt−1(hit−1).
The beliefs of the newly informed investors at history hit =( ht,s,t) are simply
those of the uninformed investor, updated by the newly informed investor’s signal, namely
pt(ht,s,t)=Ps(pt(ht,∅,∅))f o rs = H,L. The beliefs of the previously informed investor at
t who received his signal in t − 1 with history hit =( ht,s,t− 1) are deﬁned as follows. If
no other investor invested at t−1, this investor’s beliefs are the same as they were in period
t − 1, namely pt(ht,s,t)=Ps(pt−1(ht−1,∅,∅))f o rs = H,L. I fs o m eo t h e ri n v e s t o ri n v e s t e d
at t − 1,p t(ht,s,t)=P(2). The beliefs of previously informed investors who received their
signals before period t − 1 are recursively deﬁned using (29) except that the recursion starts
at r, with the beliefs of the newly informed investor at r, namely pr(hir,s,r). These strategies
and beliefs induce the conditional distributions µt(hit+1|hit) in the obvious manner.
Built into our beliefs is the idea that investors look at previous investors’ actions and
try to infer their signals. On the equilibrium path and for deviations that they cannot detect
investors infer the following. Consider the uninformed investors at public beliefs p equal
20to either P(−1) or P(0).I f t h e y s e e xt = x(PH(p),t) they infer that the newly informed
investor received a high signal. If they see xt = x(PL(p),t)=0they infer that the newly
informed investor received a low signal. If public beliefs equal P(−2), they expect to see no
investment regardless of the newly informed investor’s signal. We have also ﬁlled in beliefs
oﬀ the equilibrium path in an intuitive manner. Our results are unaﬀected by these choices.
On the equilibrium path and for undetectable deviations the newly informed investors
simply update the beliefs of the uninformed investors with their private signal. The previously
informed investor that was newly informed at t − 1, simply updates the beliefs of the newly
informed investor at t − 1 appropriately. The previously informed investor that was newly
informed at r<t−1, simply updates the beliefs of the previously informed investor at t−1
appropriately.
An important feature of the strategies is that cutoﬀ level for investment for the un-
informed investors is higher than that for the newly informed investors. To understand why
this is necessary suppose ﬁrst that both types of investors invest if their beliefs are greater
than or equal to P(0). To see why this cannot be an equilibrium consider a deviation by an
uninformed investor at t =0with beliefs P(0) to waiting. Since the newly informed investor
invests if and only if his signal is high, the deviating investor learns the value of the signal.
By (24) this deviation increases payoﬀs.
Suppose next that the cutoﬀ level for both types of investors is P(1). Suppose the ﬁrst
signal is L. The newly informed at 0 does not invest and the other investors infer he got a
low signal and their priors are P(−1). The newly informed investor at date 1 is supposed to
wait regardless of his signal. Thus the prior of the uninformed investor stays at P(−1) and
thus all newly informed investors at all future dates also wait. After a history of signals L,H,
21the newly informed at date 1 has a prior of P(0). A deviation to investing, by (18), raises the
payoﬀs.
These arguments help explain why the cutoﬀ levels of the informed and uninformed
investors must be diﬀerent. We now show that when these cutoﬀs have the form in (27)
and (28) the strategies and beliefs are an equilibrium. (The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep r o o fo ft h i s
proposition is similar to that in Chari and Kehoe 2002.)
Proposition 5. Under assumptions (18),(19) and (24) − (26), the strategies and
beliefs in (27)-(29) constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof. By construction the beliefs in (29) satisfy Bayes’ rule. We repeatedly use the
observation that by construction for any history hit,p t(hit)=P(k) for some integer k .
Consider ﬁrst optimality for histories with no detectable deviations. Consider the
strategies of the uninformed investors. For a history of the uninformed investor with beliefs
P(1) the uninformed investor is supposed to invest. Suppose instead that the investor deviates
and waits. If for all future histories the investor ends up investing then waiting merely reduces
t h el e n g t ho ft i m eo fi n v e s t m e n ti nt h eh i g hr e t u r np r oj e c ta n d ,b yd i s c o u n t i n g ,y i e l d sas t r i c t l y
lower payoﬀ. Thus, the only way that this deviation can be proﬁtable is that there are some
future histories in which this investor never invests. Consider the most pessimistic information
the investor could receive. Recall that for such a history all other active investors invest at
t. Thus, by waiting the uninformed investor receives no new information from others. By
waiting the uninformed investor could receive a signal in the future. But even if the future
signal is s = L, this investor’s belief will be P(0) and by (18) he will invest. Thus, even under
the most pessimistic information it is optimal to invest, and hence waiting is not proﬁtable.
Clearly, for histories with pt(hit) ≥ P(1) it is also optimal to invest. For a history of the
22uninformed investor with beliefs P(0), (24) ensures that it is optimal to wait, while with
beliefs P(−1) and below (19) ensures that it is optimal to wait.
Consider next the strategies of the informed investors at some history hit.T h ei n t e r -
esting histories are those in which the uninformed investors’ beliefs are P(0) or P(−1) and the
newly informed investor has just received a high signal. The strategy for the newly informed
investor speciﬁes invest and suppose this investor deviates and waits, presumably to garner
information about the signals of subsequent informed investors. If for all future histories the
investor ends up investing then waiting merely reduces the length of time of investment in
the high return project. Thus, the only way that this deviation can be proﬁtable is that
there are some future histories in which this investor never invests. After such a deviation
the beliefs of the newly informed investor are always 2 higher than that of the uninformed
investors. The reason is that the newly informed investor0s private signal raised his beliefs
by 1 and the deviation by the newly informed investor did not aﬀect his own beliefs while it
lowered the uninformed investors’ beliefs by 1.
Consider ﬁrst a history hit in which the uniformed investors’ beliefs are P(−1) and
suppose that the newly informed investor receives a high signal and hence has beliefs P(0).
If the newly informed investor deviates and waits then this deviation triggers a cascade with
no investment. To see this note that the deviation causes the uninformed investors’ beliefs to
be P(−2) permanently. Given these beliefs uninformed investors never invest. Future newly
informed investors update their beliefs to at most P(−1) and do not invest either. Thus this
deviation garners no new information. The beliefs of the deviating investor remain at P(0).
Assumption (6) then implies that given these beliefs it is optimal for the newly informed
investor to invest at t.
23Next, consider a history hit in which the uniformed investors’ beliefs are P(0) and the
newly informed investor receives a high signal and hence has beliefs P(1). We use assumption
(25) and (26) to show that investing immediately dominates attempting to learn from the
investments of future newly informed investors and then optimally adjusting the size of his
investment. Suppose the newly informed investor deviates and waits. In all subsequent
periods, the beliefs of this deviating investor are 2 higher than that of the uninformed investors
in the sense that if public beliefs are at P(k) the deviating investor’s beliefs are at P(k +2).
The reason is that the newly informed investor’s private signal raised his beliefs by 1 and
the deviation by the newly informed investor lowered the uninformed investor’s beliefs by
1 without aﬀecting his own beliefs. Next, note that a herd with investment starts when
uninformed investors’ beliefs are P(1) and a herd of no investment starts when uninformed
investors’ beliefs are P(−2). Hence, in any period after the deviation, the deviating investor’s
beliefs can be one of four values, P(0),P (1),P (2), or P(3). Moreover, if this investor’s
beliefs reach P(0) or P(3) they stay there because the uninformed investors are then in either
a cascade without investment or a cascade with investment.
We recursively solve for the strategy the yields the highest payoﬀ following the de-
viation at t as follows. Suppose that the investor has not invested until T1. For all four
beliefs (18) implies that it is optimal to invest. Suppose that the investor has not invested
until T1 − 1. If the investor’s beliefs are at either P(0) or P(3) they stay there at T1 and
discounting makes it optimal to invest at T1 − 1. If the investor’s beliefs are at P(1) (25)
makes it optimal to invest immediately while if the investor’s beliefs are at P(2) (26) makes
it optimal to invest immediately. Repeating this argument, conditional on waiting at t, the
best deviation is for the investor to invest at t +2 . Assumptions (25) and (26) then imply
24that investing at t, dominates waiting and then investing at t +2 .
For histories in which the newly informed investor’s beliefs are at or below P(−1),
(19) implies that deviating to investing is not optimal.
Finally, it is easy to show that for histories oﬀ the equilibrium path the strategies for
all investors are optimal. Q.E.D.
To show that there are herds we need an appropriate benchmark. The public signal
version of this game is not the appropriate benchmark. In the private signal game the
uninformed agents can only react to the revealed information with a one period lag, while in
the public signal game they can react immediately.
The benchmark we use is a public signal game which captures the informational lags
built into the private signal game. Consider a game with public information lags in which the
uninformed agents learn the realization of the date t signal after they have made their period
t investment decisions. In period t, given the history of publicly observed signals st−1 =
(s0,s 1,...,s t−1), the history of investments is irrelevant. Thus, for uninformed investors we
deﬁne both investments zt and beliefs pt as functions of st−1 alone. Investments and beliefs
of informed investors are functions of st. An equilibrium is deﬁned as before. In the private
signal game, given a history of signals st, we can recursively substitute out for the investment
strategies and write the investment outcome for the uninformed investors simply as a function
of st−1 and for the informed investors as a function of st. The deﬁnition of a herd of investment
and a herd of no investment is the same as before.
Under the following assumption
V (P(1),0) <v H(P(1))V (P(2),1) + vL(P(1))[vH(P(0))V (P(1),2) + vL(P(0))]. (30)
25we can show that there are herds. We think of (30) as strengthened version of (24), since,
given (7), it is easy to see that (30) implies (24). Assumption (30) implies that, in the public
signal game, in any period t investing at P(1) dominated by the following strategy. Wait
until t +1 , if the signal is high invest, if the signal is low, wait until t +2and invest if and
only if the signal is high. The following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 6. (Herd with Continuous Investment) Under (18),(19),(24) − (26),
and (30) there are both herds of investment and herds of no investment in the model with
endogenous timing.
3. Herds with Prices
Here we consider a variant of the baseline model in which investors trade investment
projects. We add a market maker who sets prices in a competitive fashion together with some
idiosyncratic traders. Otherwise the basic setup is quite similar.
There are two types of agents in our model: T risk neutral investors, who are ordered
in a sequence t =1 ,...,T. and a large number of market makers.I n v e s t o r s c a n b e o f
one of two types, idiosyncratic or informed. Idiosyncratic investors are imagined to have
some idiosyncratic reason that makes them want to buy or sell with probability 1/2 each, in
any period regardless of the price. In any given period the probability that the investor is
idiosyncratic is 1−α and the probability that the investor is informed is α. Informed investors
receive a signal about the underlying state with distribution given by (19).
Each investor is endowed with a risky project. Each project requires an investment of
one unit of eﬀort to become viable. In terms of market trades, the investor may either sell
this project to the market maker, buy a second project from the market maker or not trade.
26In terms of investments we assume that if the investor buys a second project, he must invest
in both. This assumption is innocuous since in equilibrium an investor who wants to buy will
always want to invest as much as possible. The choices of investors in any period are then:
s e l lap r o j e c t ,b u yas e c o n dp r o j e c ta n di n v e s ti nb o t h ,i n v e s ti no w np r o j e c tw i t h o u tt r a d i n g ,
do nothing. We denote these choices by S,B,I,N respectively. We let QSt denote the price
at which the investor sells the project and QBt denote the price at which the investor buys
the project.
A. The Price Critique
We begin a version of the model with exogenous timing of investment decisions. With
this timing, in equilibrium, the choice B dominates I and we suppress the option I.
The idiosyncratic agents trade in a predetermined fashion and we only need model
the strategies of the informed agents and the market maker. Since each informed agent
t a k e sa na c t i o ni no n l yo n ep e r i o d ,w en e e do n l yd e ﬁne each informed agent’s strategy for
only one period. In each period t, the only publicly observable events, denoted by zt =
(xt,Q Bt,Q St) where xt ∈ {S,B,N} denotes the sell/buy/do nothing decisions. The public
history at t , denoted ht =( z0,z 1,...,z t−1) is the history of investor decisions up through the
beginning of period t. Let pt(ht) denote the public beliefs, namely the posterior probability
that the state is H given the history ht.
An informed agent at t, in addition to the public history and his own signal confronts
a vector of selling prices and a vector of buying prices. Clearly, only the highest selling price
and the lowest buying price are relevant to this agent’s decision. An informed agent’s history
at t is hIt =( ht,s t,Q St,Q Bt) where st ∈ {H,L} denotes this agent’s signal and we interpret
27QSt and QBt to be the highest selling price and the lowest buying price respectively. The
informed agent’s beliefs are denoted by pt(hIt). This agent’s strategy at t, σt(ht) ∈ {B,S,N}
speciﬁes an action buy (B), sell (S), or do nothing (N) for each possible history. The informed
investor’s payoﬀ from selling is QSt,f r o mb u y i n gi s
[e
R(T−t)pt(hIt) − 1] + [e
R(T−t)pt(hIt) − 1 − QBt], (31)
and 0 from not trading.
In addition to the investors, there are a large number of risk neutral market makers.
The market makers do not receive signals. In period t, each market maker posts prices at




St denote the prices of a
particular market maker. If an investor buys a project from this market maker, the market






Bt) − 1,0} (32)
where pB(ht,Q 0
Bt) is the posterior of this market maker. This posterior depends on the market
maker’s posted price because the mix of investors attracted to the market maker depends on
the posted price. (Of course, the mix also depends on prices posted by other market makers
QBt(ht) and QSt(ht), but these prices are known functions of the history ht and hence are








St) is the posterior of the market maker given Q0
St.
O n ei n t e r p r e t a t i o no ft h e s ep a y o ﬀsi st h a te a c hm a r k e tm a k e ri se n d o w e dw i t hap r oj e c t
that he can run himself and that the market maker can buy a second project and operate it.
28The opportunity cost of selling the project to the investor is max{eR(T−t)pS(ht,Q 0
Bt) − 1,0}.
Thus, if the investor buys a project the proﬁts of the market maker are given by (32). Clearly,
if the investor sells a project the proﬁts of the market maker are given by (33). Another
interpretation is that market makers are intermediaries between the investors in this market
and outside uninformed investors.
An equilibrium is a collection of strategies σt(hIt,Q Bt,Q St), prices QBt(ht) and QSt(ht)
and beliefs pt(ht),p B(ht,Q Bt),p S(ht,Q St),p t(hIt) such that i) the strategies σt(hIt) are opti-
mal for the investors, ii) the prices set by market makers maximize proﬁt sg i v e ni n( 3 2 )a n d
(33), iii) the market maker’s proﬁts evaluated at QBt(ht) and QSt(ht) are equal to zero and
iv) the beliefs satisfy Bayes’ rule where possible.
In terms of characterizing the equilibrium it is easier to write the strategies as functions
of the public belief p = pt(ht) rather than the histories ht directly. The investor’s beliefs pt(hIt)
are obtained from public beliefs p by (3) if this investor’s signal is H and (4) if this investor’s
signal is L. Clearly, given beliefs pt(hIt), the informed investor’s strategy has the following
properties: buy if (31) is strictly positive and larger than QSt, sell if QSt is strictly larger
than both (31) and 0, do nothing if both buying and selling give negative payoﬀs. We specify
the actions taken when the investor is indiﬀerent below.
Consider the strategies and beliefs of the market makers. Competition among market
makers drives equilibrium proﬁts to zero for any purchase or for any sale. In equilibrium,
the market maker loses money trading with informed investors and makes money trading
with idiosyncratic investors. Competition among the market makers leads them to value the
project between the value implied by public beliefs and the value assigned by the investor
given his private information.









2 + α(1 − q))
1−α
2 + α[p(1 − q)+( 1− p)q])
. (35)
We will show that the equilibrium prices fall into two regions depending on the level
of public beliefs p. In the high region, 1 <e R(T−t)PH(p) and the equilibrium prices are
QBt(p)=m a x {e
R(T−t)PU(p) − 1,0} (36)
QSt(p)=m a x {e
R(T−t)PD(p) − 1,0}. (37)
In the low region, eR(T−t)PH(p) < 1 and the equilibrium prices are both zero.
For both regions we show that proﬁts are zero at the equilibrium prices and that no
market maker can gain by deviating. We ﬁrst show that proﬁts are zero in the high region.
To evaluate the expected proﬁts of the market maker we need to form the posteriors of the
market maker and hence we need the investor’s optimal actions. It is immediate to check that
the following choices are optimal at the equilibrium prices: investor t chooses B if st = H
and S if st = L. If the investor buys, the posterior of the market makers, conditional on a
buy decision by the investor is PU(p) given in (34). This result follows from Bayes’ rule. The
probability that the investor is idiosyncratic is (1−α)/2. The probability that the investor is
informed and receives a high signal is αq. The prior probability that the state is H is p. Thus,
the probability that the state is high and an investor buys from the market maker is given
by the numerator of (34). The denominator is simply the probability that an investor buys
from the market maker. Similar reasoning establishes that the posterior of the market makers
30t ow h o mi n v e s t o r ss e l li sg i v e nb yPD(p). Given these posteriors it follows from substituting
the posteriors and the equilibrium prices into (32) and (33) that the expected proﬁts of the
market maker are zero at these prices.
We next show that in the high region no market maker can gain by deviating. The
interesting deviations are ones that raise lower the price at which can investors can buy and
raise the price at which investors can sell. Clearly, in either case expected proﬁts are negative.
Consider next the low region. It is immediate to check that doing nothing regardless
of the signal is optimal for investor t. Since the informed investor does not trade, the market
maker realizes that all trades are with idiosyncratic traders. Hence, the market makers’
posterior stays at the public belief p. Substituting these posteriors and the equilibrium prices
into (32) and (33) it follows that the expected proﬁts of the market maker are zero at these
prices. Clearly, any deviation by a market maker leads to negative proﬁts.
Public beliefs evolve naturally from the strategies. If 1 <e R(T−t)PH(p) then
pt+1(p)=

   
   
PU(p) if zt = B
PD(p) if zt = S

   
   
while if eR(T−t)PH(p) < 1 then pt+1(p)=p.
In equilibrium, public beliefs will always be equal to P(k) for some integer k where
P(0) = p0,P(1) = PD(p0),P (−1) = PU(p0) and so on. This follows because PU and PD are
symmetric, in the sense that PU(PD(p)) = PD(PU(p)) = p.
As before we deﬁne a herd relative to a public signal game. The public signal game
which captures some of the information constraints of the private signal game is the following.
In each period t, with probability α as i g n a lH or L is drawn from the distribution in (1)
and this signal is received by the informed investor at the beginning of the period. At the
31end of the period this signal becomes public. With probability (1 − α)/2, an idiosyncratic
investor is instructed to buy and at the end of the period the public sees the signal H. With
probability (1 − α)/2, an idiosyncratic investor is instructed to sell and at the end of the
period the public sees the signal L.
In this equilibrium, under the analogs of (6) and (7), there are herds of no investment
but no herds of investment. To see this result, assume
e
R(T−N)P(0) > 1 (38)
e
RTP(−1) < 1. (39)
To see that there are herds of no investment, suppose that the ﬁrst two investors sell. (One way
t h i sc o u l dh a p p e ni st h a tt h eﬁrst two investors are informed investors who receive low signals,
w h e r ew en o t et h a tPH(P(−1)) >P (0). Other ways include the ﬁrst two investors being
idiosyncratic sellers or some combination of informed and idiosyncratic investors.) Then,
public beliefs reach P(−2). Thereafter, no informed investor trades and public beliefs stay at
P(−2). This outcome path is associated with a herd of no investment.
There are no herds of investment. To see this note that once public beliefs are at P(−1)
or higher, the informed investors take diﬀerent actions for diﬀerent signals. Subsequent
investors then adjust their priors depending upon the observed action. In this sense, the
proposition is a critique of herd behavior.
Proposition 8. (The Asset Trading Critique) The strategies, prices and beliefs de-
scribed above constitute an equilibrium. Under (38) and (39), in this equilibrium there are
herds of no investment but there are no herds of investment.
32B. Answering the Price Critique
Next consider a version of the model which allows for endogenous timing of moves. In
this version, we allow investors to invest at any time, although the decision must be made
once-and-for-all. We also allow for the option I, namely, an investor can invest in his own
project without trading.
In each period t =0 ,...,T 1 one signal arrives to the economy and is randomly dis-
tributed to one and only one agent among the set of investors who have not already received
a signal. We let the number of investors N be large relative to T1. The state is realized at 0
but only becomes known at T>T 1.
Let Bt denote the number of investors who buy and St denote the number who sell
in period t. The publicly observable events in any period t are nt =( Bt,S t) and the prices
QBt and QSt. We let zt =( nt,Q Bt,Q St). The public history is ht =( z0,z 1,,...,z t−1).A s
before, we let hit denote the history of investor i at t. This history records the signal they
have received, if any, and the date they received it in addition to the public history. Here,
among the active investors, in addition to the newly informed, the previously informed and
the uninformed, we also have idiosyncratic investors. In what follows we do not need to deﬁne
strategies for either inactive investors or idiosyncratic investors.
An investor’s strategy and beliefs are sequences of functions xt(hit) and pt(hit) that
map their histories into actions {B,S,I,N} and into the probability that the state is high.
The payoﬀ f o ra ni n v e s t o rw h ob u y si np e r i o dt with history hit and current prices QBt and
QSt is
VBt(hit)=[ e
R(T−t)pt(hIt) − 1] + [e
R(T−t)pt(hIt) − 1 − QBt], (40)
33the payoﬀ to an investor who sells is QSt,and the payoﬀ to an investoe who chooses I is




µt(hit+1|hit)max{VBt+1(hit+1),Q St+1(ht+1),V It+1(hit+1)Wt+1(hit+1)}), (41)
where µt(hit+1|hit) is the conditional distribution over history at t +1given the history at
t. The future histories and the conditional distributions are induced from the strategies and
the structure of exogenous uncertainty of the game in the obvious way. A perfect Bayesian
equilibrium is deﬁned in the obvious way.
We now show that now that we have allowed for endogenous timing there are both
herds of investment as well as herds of no investment. To show this we assume (38) and (39)
along with the analog of (24), namely,
e
RTP(0) − 1 <v B(P(0))[e
R(T−1)P(1) − 1]. (42)
where vB(p)=( 1− α)/2+α[pq +( 1− p)(1 − q)] is the probability that investors will see a
buy when the public beliefs are p.
Under these assumptions we show that the following strategies and beliefs constitute
an equilibrium. It is convenient to deﬁne the strategies as functions of the public belief p.
Let k(t) be deﬁned as the value of k that satisﬁes
e
R(T−t)PH(P(−k − 1)) < 1 <e
R(T−t)PH(P(−k)).
At public beliefs P(−k(t)) the payoﬀ from investing for a newly informed investor at t who
receives a high signal is strictly positive, while at beliefs P(−k(t)−1) this payoﬀ is negative.
The newly informed investor’s strategies at the equilibrium prices are as follows. In
the region p ≥ P(−k(t)), buy if the signal is high and sell if the signal is low. In the region
34p ≤ P(−k(t)−1), do nothing. At the equilibrium prices the uninformed investors’ strategies
are as follows. For t ≤ T1 − 1, do nothing if p ≤ P(0) and invest if p ≥ P(1). At T1, do
nothing if p ≤ P(−1) and invest if p ≥ P(0). At prices other than the equilibrium prices,
the strategies are obtained from (40) and (41). The equilibrium prices are (36) and (37) for
p ≥ P(−k(t)) and are both zero otherwise.
The public beliefs evolve as follows. For p ≥ P(−k(t)), if a buy occurs then pt+1 =
PU(p), if a sell occurs then pt+1 = PD(p) and for all events other than one buy or one sell,
pt+1 = PD(p). For p ≤ P(−k(t) − 1),p t+1 = p for all occurrences at t.
The public signal game we use as a benchmark is the simply the one we deﬁned with
exogenous timing modiﬁed to allow endogenous timing. To ensure the ineﬃciency of the
equilibrium cascades we use the following assumption,
e
RTP(1) − 1 <v B(P(1))[e
R(T−1)P(2) − 1] + (1 − vB(P(1))vB(P(0))[e
R(T−2)P(1) − 1]. (43)
This assumption is the analog of (30).
Proposition 9. (Herds with Asset Trading) The above strategies of the investors,
prices and beliefs constitute an equilibrium. In this equilibrium there are both herds of no
investment and herds of investment.
Proof. The proof that these strategies of the investors are optimal and that the beliefs
satisfy Bayes’ rule is essentially identical to the one in Proposition 5. The proof that these
prices are optimal and that there are herds of no investment is essentially identical to that in
Proposition 8.
To see that there are herds of investment consider a period t in either the private or the
public signal game in which public beliefs are P(1). In the private signal game all investors
35invest. In the public signal game we show that (43) implies that the uninformed investor
waits. We will show that waiting dominates investing. Consider the following (possibly
suboptimal) strategy. Wait at t. If the end-of-period t public signal is H invest at t+1. If the
end-of-period t public signal is L, wait at t +1 . If the end-of-period t +1signal is H invest
at t +2 , otherwise never invest. The payoﬀ to this strategy is
vB(P(1))[e
R(T−t−1)P(2) − 1] + (1 − vB(P(1))vB(P(0))[e
R(T−t−2)P(1) − 1]. (44)
Assumption (43) implies that (44) is greater than the payoﬀ to investing at t, namely
eR(T−t)P(1) − 1. Q.E.D.
4. Conclusion
This paper has taken a step towards developing models of herd behavior that can be
used in applied situations. We have done so by answering the two main critiques of the early
models.
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38Appendix
In this appendix we show that a third critique of herd behavior has merit with exoge-
nous timing but that this critique is overturned under a mild additional assumption once we
allow for endogenous timing of investment decisions.
The Information-Sharing Critique
Another critique of the baseline herd model is that agents have strong incentives to
share information. Here we show that this critique also has merit. We show that if investors
can share information by sending messages then there is an equilibrium of communication
game which coincides with the equilibrium of the public signal game.
We modify our simple model with discrete investments as follows. At the beginning
of each period t, investor t sends a message mt ∈ {H,L,∅} about his signal in that period,
where the empty set ∅ denotes an uninformative signal. The publicly observable events
are the investment decisions in each period and the messages so that the public history
ht =( x0,x 1,...,x t−1,m 0,m 1,...,m t−1). An perfect Bayesian equilibrium is deﬁned as above.
Let us suppose that each investor t truthfully reveals the private signal at t. Since
there are no costs for telling the truth, investors are indiﬀerent about their messages, and it
is optimal to tell the truth. Let the investment strategies be deﬁned so that the outcomes
coincide with those in the public signal game. The following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 4. (The Information-Sharing Critique) There is a truth-telling equilib-
rium of the communication game with outcomes that coincide with those of the public signal
game.
39Answering the Information-Sharing Critique
Here we allow investors to share information by sending messages. We show that if
there is a ﬂow beneﬁt to being one of the early investors in the project then there are strong
incentives to lie about private signals. In particular, we show that there does not exist a
truth-telling equilibrium of the associated communication game.
Consider a version of the baseline model with X = {0,1} with several changes. Some
of the changes are the same as those in the models with endogenous timing described in
the text. Investors can invest at any time, although the decision must be made once-and-
for-all. In each period t =0 ,...,T 1 with T1 <T ,one signal arrives to the economy and is
randomly distributed to one and only one agent among the set of investors who have not
already received a signal. We let the number of investors N be large relative to T1. The state
becomes known at T>T 1. .In addition, we make two assumptions. First, the rate of return
earned in the risky project is ¯ R if there are fewer than T1 investors and R otherwise, where
¯ R>R . Second, at the beginning of each period t the informed investor sends a message
mt ∈ {H,L,∅} about his signal in that period. All other investors receive the message and
then decide whether or not to invest in period t.
The publicly observable events are the aggregate investments and the messages. The
public history ht =( x0,x 1,...,x t−1,m 0,m 1,...,m t) records the aggregate investment in each
p e r i o du pt h r o u g ht h ee n do fp e r i o dt − 1 and the messages in each period up through and
including the message sent at the beginning of period t. The histories, strategies and beliefs of
newly informed investors, previously informed investors and uninformed investors are deﬁned
analogously to those in Section 1.






¯ RTP(0) < νH(P(0))e
R(T−1)P(1) + νL(P(0)) (47)
Assumptions (45)-(47) play the same role as before.
Under these assumptions truth-telling for all histories is clearly not an equilibrium. To
see this consider a newly informed investor at T1 w h oi n h e r i t sap r i o ro fP(−1) from period
T1−1. If truth-telling were an equilibrium then if the informed investors sends a message H,
the priors of all other investors rise to P(0) and they invest, while if the informed investors
sends a message L then the priors of all other investors fall to P(−2) and they do not invest.
Clearly, if the informed investor gets a high signal and lies by sending a message L he gains
the early-mover advantage. Thus, truth-telling cannot be an equilibrium for all histories.
It is useful to deﬁne Ht =( ht−1,x t−1) to be the public history at the beginning of
period t,b e f o r et h ep e r i o dt message is sent, and to deﬁne the inherited prior at t to be
the prior based on such a history. The beginning of period t history for any investor is
Hit =( Ht,s r,r).
We deﬁne a symmetric stationary equilibrium of the communication game to be one
with strategies for investment of the following form. There are functions xU, xI, and m such
that for t ≤ T1 − 1 the investment strategies of the uninformed and previously informed
investors are of the form
xt(Hit,m t)=xU(pt(Hit),m t), (48)
41the investment strategy for newly informed investors is of the form
xt(Hit,s t)=xI(pt(Hit,s t)) (49)
while the message strategy is of the form
mt(Hit,s t)=m(pt(Hit,s t),s t). (50)
(Notice that we allow the strategies at T1 to diﬀer from those for t ≤ T1 − 1.) We will say
that a message is uninformative if it is the same for both signals.
We can deﬁne a symmetric stationary equilibrium of the game without communication
analogously. It is easy to show that such an equilibrium is unique and has the following form.
There are functions xU and xIsuch that for t ≤ T1 − 1 the investment strategies of the
uninformed and previously informed investors are of the form
xt(hit)=xU(pt(hit)) =

   
   
0 if pt(hit) ≤ P(1)
1 otherwise

   
   
, (51)
the investment strategy for newly informed investors are of the form
xt(hit)=xI(pt(hit)) =

   
   
0 if pt(hit) ≤ P(0)
1 otherwise

   
   
. (52)
and beliefs are deﬁned in the obvious fashion. We then have
Proposition 7. (Herds with Information Sharing) Under (45)-(47), the symmetric
stationary equilibrium of the communication game is essentially unique, in that there is a
unique investment outcome. This outcome equals that of the symmetric stationary equilib-
rium of the no-communication game.
Proof. We will show that xU =1if and only if pt(Hit) ≥ P(1) for all mt, xI =1if and
only if pt(Hit,s t) ≥ P(0), and the message strategy is uninformative when the inherited prior
42is P(0),P(−1), or P(−2). (Notice that if these strategies are followed, the only inherited priors
at which there will be active investors at the end of the period are P(0),P(−1) and P(−2).
Oﬀ the equilibrium path, the message strategies and beliefs can be ﬁl l e di na na n a l o g o u s
manner to that in the basic model.)
Consider period T1. By (45) and (46) it follows that all investors invest if and only if
their beliefs are greater than or equal to P(0). Furthermore, the uninformed and the previously
informed investors’ decisions are independent of the newly informed investor’s message. To
see this suppose that the inherited prior is P(0) or P(−1). If the uninformed investors’
decisions depend on the newly informed investor’s message then the newly informed investor
has an incentive to mislead.
Consider next period T1−1. Consider ﬁrst the newly informed investor at T1−1. Since
this investor’s decision at T1, if he waits, is independent of the messages at T1, he can learn
nothing by waiting and hence invests if and only if his beliefs are greater than or equal to P(0).
Thus, xI =1if and only if pt(Hit,s t) ≥ P(0). If the inherited prior is either P(0) or P(−1)
the uninformed and the previously informed investors’ decisions must be independent of the
newly informed investor’s message, otherwise the newly informed investor has an incentive
to mislead. Hence, in any symmetric stationary equilibrium at any date the message must
be uninformative at an inherited prior of P(0) or P(−1). It remains to be shown that at an
inherited prior of P(−2) the message is uninformative. We consider this case below. If the
inherited prior is P(1) or higher, everyone invests and thus the message is irrelevant.
Consider next an uninformed investor at T1−1. Suppose this investor has an inherited
prior P(0) or P(−1). If this investor waits, he can observe the newly informed investor’s
investment decision at T1 −1 and hence can infer the signal and take the optimal decision in
43period T1. At inherited prior P(0), (47) implies that it is optimal to wait. At inherited prior
P(−1), (46) implies that is optimal to wait. By (45), since under the conjectured strategy all
other investors are investing, it is optimal to invest if the inherited prior is P(1) or higher.
This shows that xU =1if and only if the inherited prior is greater than or equal to P(1).
We now show that at an inherited prior of P(−2) the newly informed investor sends
an uninformative message. We will show that if this is not true at t then it gives the newly
informed investor at t − 1 an incentive to deviate from the conjectured strategy. To see
this suppose by way of contradiction that at inherited prior P(−2), truth-telling is part
of the equilibrium at t. To show that this supposition is false, consider period t − 1 and
suppose that the newly informed investor has inherited prior P(−1) and receives a high signal.
This investor’s prior rises to P(0) and he is supposed to invest (and send an uninformative
message). Suppose that he deviates and waits. The uninformed investors’ priors fall to
P(−2) at the beginning of period t. Under our posited strategy the newly informed investor
at t sends a truthful message, the deviating investor’s prior either rise to P(1) or fall to
P(−1). By (47) this deviation is proﬁtable. It follows at inherited prior P(−2) the message
must be uninformative. Q.E.D.
The communication game has nonstationary equilibria, in much the same way as the no
communication game. More interesting to us are equilibria in which the investment decisions
are stationary but the message decisions are nonstationary in that they depend on the whole
history. We can construct an example of such an equilibrium which supports more investment
than does the corresponding stationary equilibrium of the no communication game.
The construction is as follows. Suppose that if investment is zero in all periods before
T1 − 2, the newly informed investor in period T1 − 2 s e n d sat r u t h f u lm e s s a g e ,o t h e r w i s eh e
44sends an uninformative message. Let the rest of the strategies and messages be the same as
in the stationary equilibrium. Consider then the equilibrium behavior in which the initial
signals at date 0 and 1 are low. In the stationary equilibrium these signals set oﬀ ah e r do fn o
investment. In this nonstationary equilibrium, no one invests up through T1−2. If the newly
informed investor at T1−2 gets a high signal he tells the truth and all investors’ priors rise to
P(−1). If the newly informed investor in period T1−1 gets a high signal he invests and sends
an uninformative message. At the beginning of period T1, all investors invest. Thus, we have
an example in which communication partially overcomes the private information problems.
This construction depends on the discounting to be relatively high relative to the value
of information. If discounting is small then in the above example the investor at date 1 would
wait for the information at date T1 − 2 regardless of his signal. Hence no such equilibrium
could exist. When discounting is small relative to value of information one can show that if
investment decisions are stationary but message decisions are not, then the unique equilibrium
outcomes coincide with the stationary ones in the game without messages.
45